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Introduction
This article presents a simple environment
giving rise to banks that create and lend out
money. We define money to be any object
that circulates widely as a means of payment.
In our model, this object takes the form of a
fully secured and redeemable bearer bond.
This monetary instrument is issued by an agent
that can credibly commit to monitoring a pool
of real investments; that is, this capital forms
the requisite backing for a circulating private
debt instrument. While direct trade in securities
is feasible without money, we find that money
can economize on monitoring costs, which
enhances the efficiency of the exchange process.
We define a bank as an agency that simul-
taneously issues money and monitors invest-
ments. In reality, banks also accept deposits of
money, which are then redirected to borrowers.
In our model, banks do not accept deposits;
we do not view this function as a defining
characteristic of a bank.1 In particular, financial
markets also accept deposits of money in
exchange for marketable liabilities (equity and
debt instruments). We think that banks differ
from financial markets in two ways. First, bank
liabilities are designed to be high-velocity
payment instruments (money). Second, banks
specialize in screening and monitoring their
investments. Banks in our model perform both
of these functions.
While our framework allows private
non-bank liabilities to serve as the economy’s
medium of exchange (as mentioned earlier,
exchange is even possible without any money
at all), we demonstrate that the cost-minimizing
structure has a bank creating liquid funds,
which are then lent to borrowers (for example,
entrepreneurs) with suitable collateral (contin-
gent claims against future output). These liquid
funds constitute real bills of exchange; that is,
they are backed by the issuing bank with
enforceable claims against real assets (the
collateral supplied by borrowers).
  1 Needless to say, there are those who would disagree with this point
of view. To our knowledge, Bullard and Smith (2001) have the only model
featuring intermediaries that simultaneously take deposits, make loans, and
issue circulating liabilities.
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In reality, the vast bulk of the money
supply consists of private debt instruments with
contractual features similar to those embedded
in the debt instruments that circulate in our
model. In addition, the bulk of this money is
created by banks; that is, institutions that spend
considerable resources monitoring their invest-
ment portfolio. Thus, our model goes some
way in addressing the questions of why private
money takes the contractual form it does, as
well as why private money is typically supplied
by banks (as opposed to other types of private
agencies). In our model, money and banking
are inextricably linked.
Of course, we are not the first to explicitly
model money and banking together. Some
important recent contributions include Kiyotaki
and Moore (2000), Bullard and Smith (2001),
and Cavalcanti (2001). We view our work as
complementary to these papers. In Kiyotaki
and Moore (2000), banks are agents endowed
with some sort of commitment technology that
allows their liabilities to circulate. In Cavalcanti
(2001), banks have verifiable histories but
non-banks have not; as in Kiyotaki and Moore
(2000), this special feature of banks allows their
liabilities to circulate. In Bullard and Smith
(2001), the pattern in which agents meet
endows bank liabilities with relatively low
transactions costs, making these instruments the
preferred medium of exchange. Our setup is
similar to that of Diamond (1984), which
emphasizes the role of monitoring in the busi-
ness of banking; banks are endowed with no
special characteristics relative to other agents
in the economy. Under some circumstances, it
makes sense to have the economy’s monitoring
agencies (banks) issue the medium of exchange.




Consider an economy with four periods,
indexed by t =0,1,2,3. Period 0 is interpreted
as a “contracting period” (no consumption or
production takes place) where individuals
may (or may not) meet to trade in securities. In
subsequent periods, goods are produced and
consumed, and spot markets may (or may not)
open. The economy is populated by a large
number (3N ) of individuals who have prefer-
ences defined over deterministic, time-dated
consumption profiles (c1, c2, c3). Individuals are
specialized in the production of a nonstorable
time-period good (y1, y2, y3). In particular, we
assume that there are three types of individuals
and N individuals of each type: Person A pro-
duces y3; person B produces y1; and person C
produces y2. One interpretation of this setup is
that type A (C) individuals are endowed with a
long- (short-) term capital project. Let us also
assume (for simplicity only) that people have
specialized preferences: Person A wants c1;
person B wants c2; and person C wants c3
(assume also that each person values his own
good just a little bit). The chart below describes,
for each individual type, the goods that he
desires, ci, and the good that he produces (is
endowed with), yj .
ABC
Good 1 c1 y1
Good 2 c2 y2
Good 3 y3 c3
Note the complete lack of double-
coincidence of wants: Any bilateral pairing of
individuals will result in no exchange of goods.
Trade occurs at a centralized location that is
accessible by all agents in each period. In
period 0, the only objects available for
exchange are claims (contracts) against y1, y2,
and y3. In an environment where such claims
can be costlessly exchanged and enforced, a
market needs to open only once (in period 0).
In this period, A sells a claim to y3 and pur-
chases a claim to y1, B sells a claim on y1 and
purchases a claim on y2, and C sells a claim on
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Figure 1 characterizes the various trades that
occur in equilibrium. Period-0 trades are denoted
by the inner straight-line arrows and the vari-
ous time-dated trades are given by the outer
curved-line arrows. We denote a claim issued
by agent j for output produced at time t as
IOU j yt. As time unfolds, previously agreed-to
contracts are simply executed, that is, no further
trades occur. This “Arrow–Debreu” market
delivers an equilibrium allocation that is Pareto
optimal without the aid of anything that one





Consider now an environment in which not
all individuals can commit to keeping their
promises. In particular, suppose that only type
A agents can credibly commit to honoring
claims against their anticipated earnings
stream, y3. In this case, the market value of
both B’s and C’s securities as of period 0
equals zero (since these securities represent
unenforceable claims against y1 and y2, respec-
tively). At first blush, one might be inclined to
think that financial markets could break down
completely. After all, B (C) can acquire claims
to y2 (y3) only by selling his claims to y1 (y2);
but if these latter claims are worthless, then 
B (C) will be unable to purchase any claims
to y2 (y3).
In fact, if spot markets open up after period
0, then the Pareto optimal allocation can be
implemented with the following sequence of
trades: In period 0, “nothing” happens. In
period 1, agent A sells his claim y3 to agent B
in exchange for y1. While agent B does not
value y3 directly, he is nevertheless willing to
accept the security as payment, anticipating
that he will be able to resell it in the future for
something he does value. When the market
reopens in period 2, agent B is in a position to
purchase y2 directly (instead of trying to col-
lect on a previously negotiated claim to y2; this
purchase can be made with the security issued
by agent A. Agent C is willing to accept the
claim against agent A’s output because C values
y3 and the claim against y3 can (by assumption)
be enforced. Figure 2 summarizes the various
trades.
Notice what has happened here. In effect,
agent A has issued a debt instrument entitling
the bearer to the output generated in period 3
by agent A. Since agent A can commit to keep-
ing his promises, this bearer-bond will circulate
as a medium of exchange; in other words,
agent A’s security can be properly identified as
“money” in this model economy.
The money that arises in this model takes
the form of a circulating private debt instru-
ment, redeemable in some form of good or
service. As such, it may appear somewhat
removed from most modern-day monies, which
primarily take the form of either government-
issued fiat currencies or privately-issued debt
instruments that are redeemable in government
fiat (such as demand deposits). However, there
are, in fact, several instances of privately-issued
monies that are redeemable in goods or ser-
vices. For example, the Canadian Tire Corpora-
tion has for many years issued small-denomina-
tion paper notes (referred to as Canadian Tire
money) redeemable in a wide array of store
products; in small communities, these notes
have been known to circulate as a medium of
exchange. The Ithaca hour is a privately-issued
monetary instrument that circulates quite
widely in Ithaca, New York; these notes, in
various denominations, are meant to be
redeemable in the labor services of local resi-
dents. As well, if one were to interpret y3 as
gold, then history offers innumerable examples
of “gold-backed” monetary instruments.2
  2 Some of the earliest forms of paper money possessed this feature.
In the sixteenth century, for example, merchants would deposit their gold in
vaults rented from goldsmiths. Apparently, the receipts issued by the gold-
smiths (representing claims against the gold in the vault) began to circulate
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The basic lesson here is that money is
needed to facilitate some trades because not all
individuals have the ability or willingness to
commit to their promises (as John Moore has
cleverly remarked, evil is the root of all money).
The institutions that do arise to supply money
will be those that have an ability, either
endowed or manufactured, to make credible
commitments. By issuing a debt instrument
designed to circulate as a means of payment,
the supplier of money is, in a sense, renting his
commitment power to those who lack it.
Specifically, even though individual B lacks
commitment, he is able to purchase good y2
by virtue of the fact that individual A can
commit to promises.
One might legitimately ask where agent A’s
commitment power comes from and why
others seem to lack it. The model of Kiyotaki
and Moore (2000) provides some foundations
to the structure of commitment power that
depend on: 1) the existence of multiperiod
investment projects; 2) the ability of initial
creditors and debtors, if given the opportunity,
to conspire against a third party who purchases
existing debt; and 3) an institution, called a
bank, that by design cannot conspire against
anyone. In that environment, it is the bank’s
liability that circulates in the economy. Below,
we provide a different foundation that is based
on asymmetric information and monitoring
activities, instead of asymmetric distribution of
commitment power.
II. Money and 
Banking
In this section, we modify the physical envi-
ronment described above in a few simple ways.
To begin, assume that all individuals are identi-
cal in terms of their willingness and/or ability
to commit to their promises and that commit-
ment is feasible only up to what is verifiable
(for example, through observation by a third-
party enforcement agency).
Assume that there is now some risk associ-
ated with the endowment of each agent; in
particular, for t = 1, 2, 3,
y with probability  1–   yt = { 0 with probability   .
In addition, suppose that there is no
aggregate risk, so that (1–  )Ny represents the
aggregate output in each period. We will con-
tinue to assume that individuals are risk-neutral.
The structure of information is as follows:
Each person has the ability to costlessly
observe the return realized on his own “project.”
Other agents are also in a position to observe
this return, but only at a utility cost equal to  ;
think of this cost as representing the effort
exerted in monitoring project returns. This
setup is similar to that of Diamond (1984),
except that we will assume that if an agent is
monitored, the information revealed becomes
a matter of public record.3
Arrow–Debreu 
Securities
The type of securities that will be exchanged
on this market are contracts that promise
delivery of a good in the event that returns are
reported to be positive. Since it will always be
in the interest of the person who issues a
security to report zero output (we assume
that people cannot commit to tell the truth),
it has to be understood that the holder of any
such security will, in equilibrium, monitor
project returns.
Clearly, for any kind of trade to occur,
agents must have an incentive to purchase
claims from other agents and then to monitor
them. If the marginal utility of state-contingent
consumption is constant (and equal to unity),
then the parameter restriction (1–  )y>     is
sufficient to guarantee that trade and monitor-
ing will occur. As in the previous section,
period 0 trades are as follows: A sells a contin-
gent claim to y3 and purchases one on y1;
B sells a contingent claim on y1 and purchases
one on y2; and C sells a contingent claim on y2
and purchases one on y3. In period 1, agent A
will monitor agent B; in period 2, agent B will
monitor agent C; and in period 3, agent C will
monitor agent A. Note that the total (economy-
wide) monitoring costs are 3N . Figure 3
summarizes the various trades and monitoring. 
  3 This assumption is made primarily to simplify the exposition; it
does not affect our main conclusions.
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Instead of trades in Arrow–Debreu securities,
imagine that trades occur in a sequence of spot
markets with the help of a circulating private
debt instrument issued by type A agents. The
private debt instrument issued by A is a contin-
gent claim, as described earlier. Assume that
project returns are realized at the beginning
of each period and that a spot trade of money
for goods occurs after the period’s risk has
been resolved.
The sequence of trades is as follows: In
period 1, just after project returns are realized,
type A agents offer their security to anyone
who actually has y1 to sell (as opposed to a
contingent claim against y1 that they would
have purchased before realizing project
returns). In the context of this environment,
the people who are in a position to approach
type A agents are the “successful” type B
agents. It is important to note here that under
this scenario, successful type B agents can
costlessly reveal their success by the very act
of displaying the goods they have to trade; in
other words, there is no need for type A agents
to monitor.
Successful type B agents are willing to
accept a type A security as payment because
they anticipate being able to use this security
as payment for future goods that they desire.
In particular, following the resolution of risk
in period 2, a type B agent can purchase y2
directly from a successful type C agent. Again,
there is no need for monitoring. Type C agents
willingly accept type A securities as payment
because they represent direct claims against
24
the goods that they desire. In period 3, each
type C agent with a claim against y3 will pre-
sent the claim for redemption.
In order for any claim against A to be
enforced, a monitoring expense must be
incurred. Notice that while all N type A agents
have issued securities, these securities end up
being held by only (1– )N type C agents.
Consequently, each type C agent will hold
claims for y3 that were issued by different type
A agents. To avoid coordination and monitoring
problems, it makes sense here to appoint a
“designated monitor,” that is, to let one (arbi-
trarily chosen) type C agent set up a “monitoring
business” that agrees to monitor a type A agent
in exchange for some fraction   of the project
returns.4 Since there are N projects that require
monitoring (assume that projects cannot be
monitored sequentially), the monitor incurs a
total cost N . Assuming free entry into the
monitoring business, the equilibrium monitoring
fee   must adjust to ensure zero net returns to





Under this “monetary regime,” the expected
utility payoff for agents A and B is equal to
(1– )y, which clearly exceeds the payoff they
would have generated under the Arrow–Debreu
market structure: (1–  )y – >0. For each type
C agent (including the monitor), the expected
payoff is identical to what he would have gen-
erated under the Arrow–Debreu market struc-
ture. Consequently, we see that monetary
exchange dominates trade in state-contingent
securities by economizing on aggregate moni-
toring costs; that is, N  < 3N  . Figure 4 sum-
marizes the various trades and monitoring.
The C agent who does all of the monitoring
is denoted by C M. Note that in Figure 4, C M
receives  * from another C agent only if that C
  4 For values of λ less than half, the typical successful typeC
agent will hold one plus some fraction of type A IOUs. A typeC agent
will not have an incentive to monitor the type A agent for which he holds
a fraction of an IOU if the fraction is sufficiently small: In this situation,
the monitoring cost exceeds its expected benefit. If all typeC agents
who hold a fraction of an IOU issued by the same type A agent cannot
somehow co-ordinate their monitoring activities, then this type A agent
will not be monitored. But if a type A agent is not monitored, there will






























Economic Review 2001 Q325
agent’s claim pays off. In an attempt to reduce
its complexity, figure 4 does not depict the
potential exchange of y3 for a claim against y3
between agent C M and an A agent.
Banking
The type of monitoring activity described
above is commonly regarded as an important
part of the business of banking. But banks are
also associated with the business of creating
liquidity (nowadays in the form of transaction
deposits, but historically also in the form of
paper money), which is injected into the econ-
omy by way of money loans (as well as wage
and dividend payments). In the model 
described above, the money creation and
monitoring activities are undertaken by sepa-
rate sets of agents; in reality, these activities
appear to be bundled. What might account for
this bundling?
The first thing to note is that our model is
not necessarily inconsistent with the fact that
money creation and monitoring activities are
bundled (although the model does not neces-
sarily point to bundling as the unique organi-
zational form either). We could, for example,
imagine that the monitoring agent also decides
to take on the responsibility of creating the
economy’s monetary instrument. In this case,
such an agent would more closely resemble
what is commonly called a bank. So let us
consider what happens when the monitoring
agent also issues money (for example,
banknotes).
Trading activity proceeds as follows: In
period 0, A agents approach the bank for a
money loan. Suppose that each type A agent
borrows (M/N) banknotes, which he promises
to pay back in period 3 (if his project return is
positive) with interest equal to R; that is,
(1+R)(M/N) represents the principal and inter-
est that is to be paid back in the form of ban-
knotes. Agent A then takes these banknotes
and uses them to purchase y1 from type B
agents with output to sell. Since M “dollars”
are exchanged for (1– )Ny units of output, the
first-period price level is
1 M
P* 1 = [(1– )y ] N  
.
In period 2, each B agent with money
purchases the output displayed for sale by
successful type C agents; the equilibrium price
level remains the same, that is, P* 2 = P* 1.
Now, in period 3, type C agents who hold
banknotes will want to purchase the output
produced by successful type A agents. The
question here is whether a type A agent is will-
ing to give up a good that he values (slightly)
in exchange for paper that he does not value
at all. To give an A agent the incentive to
behave “properly,” the initial money-loan con-
tract must contain a clause that transfers prop-
erty rights over project returns from A to the
bank in the event of default. In effect, the
money loan is collateralized with securities that
constitute contingent claims against y3. As
before, all type A agents must be monitored.
Consequently, it will do no good for a success-
ful type A agent to claim failure. At this stage,
the agent has the choice of either selling his
output for the banknotes that he needs to pay
back the money loan; or of having his output
“seized” by the bank (which owns an enforce-
able contingent claim against it). Either of
these options leaves a type A agent with the
same payoff, so the agent might rationally
choose either one. A third possibility is that an
A agent might renegotiate the terms of the loan
contract, leaving both the bank and himself
better off (at the expense of type C agents). To
prevent either outright default or renegotiation
(avoiding both would be necessary for the
banknote to circulate in the first place), the
monetary instrument must be include a
redemption clause: The note-bearer must have
the right to redeem the banknote for output.5
  5 A similar redemption clause appears to be embedded within
modern-day private monetary instruments (for example, deposits in




















M monitor  *
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Finally, if R >0 (as must be the case), then it
appears that there are not enough banknotes
in circulation: How can A agents acquire the
money needed to pay off a debt equal to
(1+R)M when there are only M dollars in cir-
culation? It turns out that some “new money”
(RM dollars) must be injected into the econ-
omy in period 3 by the bank itself. That is, the
bank simply prints up RM dollars of new
money, which can be used to purchase some
period-3 output to compensate the bank for its
monitoring services. With free entry in the
banking business, the interest rate charged by
the bank must result in zero profits; so
R*M =P* 3Nµ. 
What prevents a bank from “overissuing”
money at this stage? We have to assume that
the supply of banknotes is verifiable (that is,
the bank’s balance sheet can be observed by a
court and cannot be falsified). Consequently,
the bank will be bound to charge a maximum
interest of R* and will not be in a legal posi-
tion to inject more than R*M of new money
into the economy. Now, in order to derive R*,
we need an expression for the price level in
period 3. Since (1+R)M dollars are exchanged
for (1– )Ny units of output, the price level
must satisfy the condition 
(1+R*)M
P* 3= 
(1– )Ny  
.
Combining these latter two expressions, we




(1– )y  – µ
>0;
1 M
P* 3 = [(1– )y – µ] N
> P* 1 = P* 2.
Notice that period-3 inflation (which is
fully expected) has served to diminish the
purchasing power of C’’s money holdings; but
in equilibrium, this loss is exactly equal to the
amount of purchasing power the type C agent
would willingly have transferred to a profes-
sional monitor (as demonstrated in the earlier
scenario). The various trades and monitoring
are depicted in figure 5. The C agent who is
the bank is denoted as CB.
Transaction Costs
The equilibrium allocation associated with this
“banking regime” corresponds to the allocation
that resulted when money creation and moni-
toring activities were performed by separate
sets of agents. Strictly speaking, the model
here is unable to pin down the banking regime
as a unique organizational form.
However, suppose that we follow Bullard
and Smith (2001) and extend the model
slightly by assuming that every time a good
“changes hands,” a small fraction of it, 
0 < ε < 1, disappears. One can think of ε as
being a small transaction cost. Let us now
compare the total transactions costs when
money creation and monitoring are bundled
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When money creation and monitoring are
unbundled, each type A agent issues a security
that circulates which is ultimately monitored by
one of the type C agents. Goods produced in
periods 1 and 2 change hands once, so the
total transactions costs in these periods is 
2(1– )Nεy. At date 3, however, some of the
goods produced will change hands twice:
There is a set of transactions between C agents
who possess A’s security and A agents who
produced output; there is also a set of transac-
tions between C agents who now possess
goods and the monitor who requires payment
for his services. The transactions costs incurred
in period 3 are (1– )N (1+ *)εy if the monitor
did not possess any securities issued by A agents
and (1– )N (1+ *) εy –  *εy if he did.
Hence, total transactions costs for the economy
are 3(1– )N εy +N (1+ *)εy –   *εy, where
  = 0 if the monitor did not possess any
securities issued by A agents and   =1 if he
did (recall that whether the monitor ends up
holding A’s security depends on whether his
project is successful).
In contrast, when money creation and mon-
itoring are bundled, goods change hands only
once at each date. In particular, at date 3 the
bank’s compensation for its monitoring costs
takes the form of printing money and directly
purchasing goods from type A agents. Hence,
under this regime, total transaction costs are
3(1– )Nεy, which is strictly less than the total
transaction costs associated with the latter
arrangement. Hence, when there are transac-
tion costs associated with the exchange of
goods, a banking regime—an institutional
setup in which monitoring and money creation
are undertaken by the same agent—will Pareto
dominate an environment in which money
creation and monitoring activities are per-
formed by separate agents.
Conclusions
We have constructed an environment in which
something that looks like a bank emerges as
an efficient exchange mechanism. A bank
monitors projects and issues money that 
circulates as a medium of exchange. When
individual transactions are costly, the banking
institution turns out to be an efficient trading
mechanism because goods are only exchanged
between the initial seller and the final con-
sumer. An economy that has private (nonbank)
securities circulating will have some fraction of
final output exchanging hands more than
once; as a result, its transaction costs will be
higher than those of a banking economy.
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